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Criteria for the Optimal Design of a Social Security Retirement System 
 
Robert L. Brown 
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science 
University of Waterloo 
Abstract 
This paper discusses a series of selection points in the design and financing of social 
security retirement systems.  For each criterion, the paper lists and discusses advantages 
and disadvantages of the options available.   
 
The selection points include: 
--Funded versus PAYGO 
--Minimum benefits:  Demogrant or Welfare 
--Progressive versus Regressive 
--Voluntary versus Mandatory 
--Individual Accounts versus Commingling of Risk 
--Public versus Private sourcing 
--Automatic Balancing Mechanisms 
--System Risk Diversification 
 
It is the sincere hope of the author that this discussion will create even more debate of the 
issues surrounding these important selection criteria which, in turn, will result in better 
social security retirement systems for all. 
 
RJsumJ 
Cet article examine un certain nombre de points pertinents à la mise en place et au 
financement des retraites publiques. Pour chaque critère, ce papier fait l’inventaire et 
discute des avantages et inconvénients de chaque option disponible.  
 
Les critères de sélection sont les suivants:  
- Un système à capitalisation entière contre un programme par répartition  
- Prestations minimales: subventions démographiques ou prestations d’aide sociale  
- Progressif ou régressif  
- Contribution volontaire ou obligatoire  
- Comptes individuels ou mise en commun des risques  
- Source de financement publique ou privée  
- Des mécanismes d'équilibrage automatiques  
- Diversification des risques du système  
 
C'est l'espoir sincère de l'auteur que cet article engendre une discussion encore plus 
approfondie  autour de ces critères de sélection importants qui, à son tour, se traduirait 
par la mise en place d’un meilleur système de retraite public pour tous. 
 
JEL Classification: H55 
Key words:  Social Security design and financing, Funded pay-as-you-go, Individual 
Accounts, Automatic Balancing Mechanisms   2
Introduction 
 
This paper reviews a series of criteria that are decision points in the design of social 
security retirement systems (SSRS).  For each criterion, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the options available are outlined and discussed briefly.  In this manner, 
the paper attempts to lead public policymakers to a set of design criteria that would result 
in optimal design for any SSRS.  The author hopes to stimulate wide discussion of these 
important debating points. 
 
It can be shown that the Notional DC systems in Sweden, Italy and Poland are equivalent 
to Career Average DB plans with annual adjustments based on economic growth.  Thus, 
any analysis about DC SSRS will reference Individual Account systems, not Nominal DC 
systems. 
 
The paper is targeted to SSRS public policymakers.  Thus, some very traditional points of 
debate, while referred to, are not discussed in great detail. 
 
Financing:  Funded versus PAYGO 
 
First, one should differentiate between funding and financing.  SSRS need not be funded;  
certainly not fully-funded.  They only need to be financed in a sustainable manner, which 
is quite a different matter.  Having said that, it is very difficult to achieve continuous 
sustainability in a pure pay-as-you-go system without unacceptable contribution 
volatility.  Thus, it is the position of this paper that an optimal SSRS design would 
include enough (partial) funding to overcome the peaks and valleys caused by the 
volatility in demographic and economic variables. 
 
More heavily funded SSRS are preferable when rates of return on investments exceed the 
rate of growth of the contributions base of the SSRS (which is the reality in many 
advanced economies with aging populations today).  Less funding (and hence more 
PAYGO financing) would be preferred when the growth of the SSRS contributions base 
exceeds the rate of return on investments (see Aaron (1966) or Thompson (1998)). 
 
The rate of growth of the contributions base of a SSRS is itself a function of several 
variables.  A primary factor is the growth rate of the work force.  This, in turn, is the 
result of a growing population (through rising fertility or higher immigration) or higher 
labor force participation rates.  Also, the contributions base will normally rise when there 
is real wage growth, which usually relies on productivity gains.   
 
It is worthy of note, however, that a funded SSRS is inherently no more secure and no 
more predictable (i.e., less volatile) than a PAYGO scheme.  It is no easier to predict 
future investment rates than future fertility rates.  Thus, using a ‘stability’ argument in 
favor of fuller funding may find merit in some advanced economies with aging 
populations today, but may not be advisable in many other economies or other times.  
One need only review the history of many European (fully-funded) SSRS in the period 
1930 to 1950 to understand the validity of this observation (when these fully-funded   3
SSRS were wiped out by hyper inflation).  Further, Thompson (1998) states that 
historical evidence suggests that sensitivity to economic changes is likely to be a more 
serious source of unpredictability than sensitivity to changes in population demographics. 
 
SSRS are effectively means to allocate goods and services between workers and retirees.  
That is, ‘they’ decide how much of the Gross National Product SSRS beneficiaries can 
consume.  The absolute dollar value of the promised benefit has little meaning in and of 
itself.  
 
If a PAYGO social security system has a 10% contribution rate, then workers have 
effectively agreed to pass all of their production on Monday morning over to the 
country’s retirees for consumption. 
 
If the plan is fully funded, then the transfer is more complex, but equivalent.  The worker 
takes 10% of pay (reflecting the value of 10% of product) and seeks to buy assets.  Such 
assets will be available from retirees (who amassed them during their working lifetime).  
Upon sale, the retiree gets money for his/her assets and then uses this money to buy 
goods and services.  The end result is equivalent to a PAYGO scheme.  In particular, both 
PAYGO SSRS and fully-funded SSRS are absolutely dependent on a next generation of 
workers to produce goods and services.  Neither is demographically immune.  If there is 
no production, there is no consumption. 
 
Both systems suffer from political risk.  In a PAYGO SSRS, the government can change 
the benefit or contribution formula and deny workers their assumed promise.  In a fully-
funded SSRS, the government can allow inflation to deplete the value of the individual 
accounts, once again nullifying the implied contract with workers. 
 
These axioms bear further reflection.  Many important re-designs of SSRS around the 
world were based on criteria other then “who gets to share in total Gross National 
Product”?  Other less important (side-bar) issues became the focus of the reforms. Does 
fuller funding increase national savings?  Does the financing method create a more rapid 
rate of economic growth?  Does the level of funding assist in creating a good banking 
system or a good stock market infrastructure?  What impact does the design of the SSRS 
have on labor force participation rates or on the age of retirement?  Does the design of the 
SSRS incent a cash economy?  A careful reading of the literature says that there are no 
clear answers to most of these questions (see, for example, Brown, 1997).  While these 
may be very important questions, they should not be the driving focus for a well-designed 
SSRS.  The number one criterion should be the ability of the elderly to share in total 
Gross National Product at least to the extent that poverty is alleviated. 
 
On another point, one must ask if there is any economic difference between a PAYGO 
SSRS and one that is funded but where the assets are all government bonds (especially if 
the positive or negative cash flow of the SSRS is included in a unified government 
budget).  Those who pay SSRS contributions are the same people as those who pay off 
the debt represented by government bonds.  Does it make any difference (except in the   4
name) which happens:  SSRS contributions are paid or bonds are redeemed?  They are 
surely the same in both size and timing. 
 
Funded SSRS also introduce political risk. As Sass (2006, p8) states: 
 
These risks are that a trust fund would: 
 
•  become a captive source of credit that would fund the government at 
below-market rates; 
  •invest in “socially desirable” projects and/or avoid “socially 
undesirable” projects; 
•  use its power as a major shareholder to promote “socially desirable” 
and/or avoid “socially undesirable” corporate decisions, such as those 
regarding plant closing or mergers and acquisitions;  and 
•  prop up financial markets in a “crisis”. 
 
At the very least, an independent, ‘at-arm’s-length’ investment agency should be 
mandated.  One such workable model would be the Canada Pension Plan Investment 
Board created in 1996. 
 
Finally, a dishonest leader of a country with a funded SSRS, can abscond with the plan 
assets in the middle of the night.  If the plan is PAYGO, then the leader can only abscond 
with its liabilities!  
 
Minimum Benefits:  Demogrant or Welfare 
 
An optimal SSRS should include in its total benefit package a minimum benefit that is 
enough to provide economic security to the elderly at least equal to an accepted measure 
of poverty.  That is, an acceptable SSRS will create at least subsistence level benefits.   
 
It is the position of this paper that this first pillar of benefits (sometimes called Pillar 0) 
should be financed out of general tax revenues and not from earmarked contributions.  
This will make the Pillar 1 SSRS much easier to design since it does not have to include 
in its formulation the provision of a minimum benefit.  As one example, the design of the 
U.S. OASDI system is unnecessarily complex because it is expected both to provide a 
minimum benefit but also have a strong sense of individual equity (whereby benefits are 
a function of contributions).  OASDI could be designed more easily and more logically if 
there existed a separate Pillar 0 benefit.  While the U.S. does have a Supplementary 
Security Income (SSI) program, it is too small to satisfy the full needs of poverty 
alleviation (See Brown and Prus (2004) and Wiseman and Ycas (2008)).  
 
The question now arises as to whether Pillar 0 should be paid as a demogrant or welfare 
benefit.  The difference is whether or not there is an income and/or asset test for the Pillar 
0 benefit that will result in the benefits being clawed back for many recipients. 
   5
Such clawbacks can cause perverse actions by the SSRS participants.  For example, this 
can create incentives that work against private saving on the part of workers.  Or workers 
may cash out their SSRS benefits at retirement (i.e., take a lump sum where possible), 
spend this cash quickly, so as to qualify for the Pillar 0 benefit.  Clearly, this is not 
desirable. 
 
This is a very difficult problem.  One must balance the rate of the clawback very 
carefully.  If the clawback is low, then Pillar 0 will be very costly and benefits may go to 
recipients who are not in need.  The extreme of this is a demogrant benefit with no 
clawbacks (although benefits might be taxable).  If the clawback is high, then the 
perverse incentives outlined above will be the result. 
 
Regardless of whether the Pillar 0 benefits are demogrant or welfare, there should be a 
lengthy period of qualification (e.g., residency) for the minimum benefit.  Short 
qualifying periods will lead to other perverse results such as early retirement or low 
labour-force participation.  A 40-year qualifying period is not unreasonable. 
 
 
Progressive versus Regressive 
 
Most SSRS anticipate some redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.   
 
However, if the particular SSRS is truly a pure DC system set up using individual 
accounts, then that system will be regressive.  Why is this so?  The reason is that wealthy 
people live longer than poor people (and this is not reflected fully in the private annuity 
markets).  Evidence of this is overwhelming (for a good summary of factors affecting 
retirement mortality see Brown and McDaid, 2003). 
   
SSRS that have minimum guaranteed benefits as Pillar 0 may not need any explicit 
progressivity in Pillar 1 benefits.  This would describe the Swedish NDC system that has 
such minimum Pillar 0 benefits and a pure DC Pillar 1.  In Canada, the Canada/Quebec 
Pension Plans (C/QPP) do not have to be progressive in themselves since there are 
already Pillar 0 benefits (Old Age Security and Guaranteed Income Supplement) that are 
funded by general tax revenues and are highly progressive.  Despite this, the C/QPP have 
an explicit feature in their contribution formulae that make them progressive regardless of 
Pillar 0. 
 
OASDI is clearly progressive (and its progressivity overcomes the longer life expectancy 
differential in favour of the wealthy) through its benefit formula with two bend points 
(i.e., lower wages achieve a higher benefit ratio than higher wages). 
 
If a SSRS raises its Normal Retirement Age (the earliest age at which full benefits are 
payable) then the probability that the system is regressive may rise.  This is because 
raising the Normal Retirement Age represents a larger percentage cut in benefits for those 
with short life expectancies than for those with longer life expectancies.  The particular   6
impact depends on the mortality patterns in the country by income level.  For a full 
discussion, see Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008). 
 
Finally, there is a limit to how progressive the SSRS can be.  One important attribute of a 
well-designed SSRS is social solidarity.  That is, all participants should want the system 
to continue in place.  That means that even after accounting for progressiveness, the 
system must provide meaningful benefits to all participants, across the full earnings 
spectrum. 
 
For a deeper discussion of progressiveness versus regressiveness, in general, see Brown 
and Ip (2000). 
 
Voluntary versus Mandatory 
 
In a true voluntary SSRS, workers could choose to join, or not, on a completely voluntary 
basis.  Few national SSRS have gone this route.  Most national social security systems 
appear, at least at first glance, to be mandatory.  However, there can be a number of ways 
that this feature is depreciated. 
 
For example, some systems do not require contributions from workers until their earnings 
achieve a defined level.  This may encourage workers (and their employers) to shift into 
the cash economy.  This will be reinforced if the system provides some guaranteed 
minimum benefit or provides significant benefits for very short periods of attachment or 
very small total contributions. 
 
Other systems allow ‘drop-out’ periods because of military service, disability, 
unemployment, child rearing and so on without any commensurate decrease in ultimate 
benefits.  Again, such features create incentives for inappropriate action amongst the 
workers (moral hazard).  However, given the choice of some well-defined ‘drop-out’ 
periods versus a SSRS that allows maximum benefits to be achieved with a very short 
participation history, one should prefer the ‘drop-out’ option.  In fact, the ability to 
achieve maximum benefits without at least 40 years of contributions seems ill-advised. 
 
In summary, a mandatory SSRS will mitigate anti-selection and moral hazard.   
 
James et al (2008) point out the advantages of not having to be concerned about anti-
selection.  According to their calculations, a mandatory, public SSRS offering the same 
benefits as the C/QPP would cost between 8 and 9.5 per cent of pensionable earnings (as 
defined by the C/QPP).  The variance between 8 and 9.5 per cent is dependent on the 
asset-liability matching strategy.  Similar benefits under a voluntary, private annuity 
system would require contributions of 11 to 12.5 percent.  Private cost rates exceed the 
mandatory/public rate because of high private administrative costs and adverse selection 
costs (and these have about equal impact, i.e., 50/50.).  There also has to be a profit 
margin in a private system. 
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Adverse selection occurs because potential annuitants know more about their health than 
the insurance company.  If the SSRS is voluntary, then more individuals with higher-
than-average life expectancy will participate, biasing the average longevity upward thus 
requiring higher contribution rates.  Mitchell et al (1999) show that the expected present 
value of annuity payouts per dollar of annuity premium averages between 80 and 85 cents 
for an individual chosen at random from the population, and between 90 and 94 cents for 
an individual chosen at random from the pool of individuals who purchase annuities.  
This could be alleviated if there were more risk classification within the annuity product.  
 
Thus, a totally voluntary SSRS could result in a pricing spiral as those with lower life 
expectancy opt out.  Ultimately, this pricing spiral means that SSRS contribution rates 
will only allow the most select lives to achieve a full market value through their 
participation. 
 
At the other extreme, a mandatory SSRS, based on the principles of individual equity 
(i.e., non-progressive) will result in poorer workers subsidizing more wealthy workers 
since the latter live significantly longer on average.  This is the likely result in Defined 
Contribution SSRS, including Individual Accounts SSRS.  In this case, there should be 
other design features to counter this regressive redistribution (as previously discussed).   
 
If one prefers a voluntary system, but wants to maximize coverage, then an opt-out 
system is preferable to an opt-in system.  Studies have consistently shown that automatic 
enrollment results in much higher participation rates than being forced to act to opt in.  
This is indicated in Table 1 (Choi et al, 2001).  (See also Schwartz, 2004.)   8
TABLE 1.  401(k) Participation by Tenure Before and After Automatic Enrollment 
 
Company B  Company C  Company D 
Hire Date   
After - 
Before 
Hire Date   
After - 
Before 















T e n u r e            
  6 months  26.4%  93.4%  67.0%  35.7% 85.9% 50.2% 42.5% 96.0% 53.5% 
12  months  37.8 95.7 57.9 40.2 85.3 45.1 49.6 96.6 47.0 
18  months  47.7 97.0 49.3 44.3 86.0 41.7 56.6 97.2 40.6 
24  months  54.1 97.6 43.5 49.8 85.7 35.9 61.7 99.1 37.4 
30  months  60.0 97.7 37.7  --  --  --  65.6 98.8 33.3 
36 months  64.7  98.8  34.1  --  --  --  69.0  100.0  31.0 
The sample for Companies C and D is all 401(k)-eligible employees. For Companies B and D, the first two columns of numbers give the fraction of employees who have ever 
participated in the 401(k) plan.  For Company C, the first two columns give the fraction of employees contemporaneously participating in the 401(k) plan. 
 
Source:  Choi et. al.  (2001)   9
Individual Accounts versus Commingling of Risk 
 
The primary purpose of a SSRS is to allocate rights to retirees to consume Gross National 
Product in a manner that minimizes the probability of living in poverty.  In that regard, 
the design of the SSRS should also be one that mitigates risk (variance) as much as 
possible in the goal of achieving income security. 
 
For retirement income security, risks include:  investment and investment expense risk, 
interest rate risk, timing risk, inflation risk and longevity risk. 
 






Source:  Burtless, 2009 p 12 
 
Clearly, the worker can decrease the investment risk by choosing less volatile 
investments such as government bonds.  While it is true that the volatility decreases 











Source:  Burtless, 2009, p 16 
 
 
The replacement ratios in the above graphs also display the impact of the timing risk.  
This is the risk of being forced to annuitize when interest rates are low and annuity prices 
are, therefore, high.  This is true in 2010. 
 
For each of the five risks listed, large commingled systems achieve superior expected 
outcomes than Individual Accounts;  some through the effective application of the Law 
of Large Numbers, others through the efficiencies of scale. 
 
A summary of the failure of Individual Account SSRS in South and Latin America can be 
found in Arenas de Mesa and Lago (2006), Gill et al. (2004) or Sinha (2002). 
 
In a commingled SSRS, all participants (and this may be the entire work force) share 
these risks.  In fact, some risks may be shared across generations of workers.  In an 
Individual Accounts system, the individual worker carries all of these risks unilaterally.  
This is a responsibility for which the worker has little capacity.  Most individual workers 
do not have investment expertise, and if they can find investment expertise it comes at a 
high cost.  
 
On the other hand, large commingled funds can hire extremely good investment 
management at low per unit cost.  Such large funds can also participate in private   11
placements not available to most investment funds.  Further, they can achieve much 
lower per-unit administrative cost ratios. 
 
Size matters.  Ambachtsheer (2008) provides the following illustration.  Your salary 
moves from $35,000 to $65,000 over a 40-year career.  You want to replace 60 per cent 
of your final salary (= $39,000) upon retirement.  You will get $25,000 from social 
security (comparable to Canada and the U.S.), so you need $14,000 per annum indexed. 
 
Assuming you can earn i = 4 per cent real for 20 years and 3 per cent real thereafter, you 
need to contribute 6 per cent of salary over your lifetime to achieve this goal.  If you have 
a well-managed plan (as can be expected on a net basis from a large commingled plan) 
that can earn an extra 1 per cent per annum, then the 6 per cent contribution rate falls to 
4.5 per cent.  On the other hand, if you face management expense fees equivalent to 2 per 
cent (i.e., your rates of return are 2 per cent and 1 per cent real) then the contribution rate 
required rises to 10 per cent.  Further, if inflation is running at 2 per cent per annum, you 
have made no net gain in purchasing power at all.  You are merely standing still. 
 
The literature indicates that if individuals are responsible for managing their own capital 
accumulation accounts, they do so conservatively and receive lower rates of return.  They 
also face management expense ratios that could decrease their net rate of return by as 
much as 3 per cent (300 bps). 
 
Ambachtsheer (ibid) says that these commingled asset pools should be no smaller than 
$10B.  Such commingling would have to be facilitated by government regulation, but 
could be done entirely by private sector managers so long as the total expenses were low 
(e.g., less than 40 basis points). 
 
Finally, at retirement, the individual worker must either manage his or her own retirement 
or buy an individual annuity.  Brown, 2000, p19, states that the opportunity to participate 
in an actuarially fair annuity market is equivalent to a 50% increase in non-annuitized 
wealth.  However, the higher cost involved in having to purchase a retirement annuity 
from the private sector because of higher administrative costs and the anti-selection factor 
faced by the private insurer has already been noted.   That is, the insurer will price all 
annuities on the assumption that a voluntary purchaser has five-star life expectancy.  
Clearly this results in the poor subsidizing the rich (ibid).  Thus unless the retiree has 
five-star life expectancy, it is not clear which is better: buying an annuity from the private 
sector or managing one’s own assets and one’s own longevity risk (Brown, 2000, states 
that the vast majority are still better off to annuitize).  
 
Without having a separate discussion, it is for the reasons just outlined that an optimal 
SSRS will provide income for life rather than a lump sum at the defined point of 
retirement.  Individuals cannot manage these lump sums and fair-value annuities are only 
available to those in five-star health (see Diamond, 2004).  In conclusion, a lump-sum 
SSRS should not be adopted. 
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Again, without a separate discussion, it is the position of this paper that benefits should 
retain their purchasing power.  Thus, benefits should be indexed to at least the cost of 
living.  Whether benefits should be indexed to wages (thus guaranteeing a consistent 
standard of living for retirees) will not be discussed in this paper.  However, most 
Individual Account proposals for Social Security reform do not include indexation of 
benefits. 
 
Many portray Individual Accounts SSRS as being advantageous because such systems do 
not provide incentives for early retirement.  Countering that, however, is the indication 
that DC SSRS can cause significant variation in the dependency ratio over time.  That is, 
countries dominated by DC schemes may, over time, be exposed to significant risk in the 
size of its labor force (MacDonald and Cairns, 2007).  This is true because the financial 
market’s condition strongly affects the retirement pattern of its citizens, making the 
dependency ratio unpredictable which may be contrary to the interests of society at large.  
(To illustrate, the economic meltdown of 2008 would decrease DC account balances 
causing those wishing to retire to stay in the labor force at a time of high unemployment; 
rapid economic expansion and healthy asset returns would have the opposite, but still 
perverse, impact.) 
 
Finally, while this paper discusses only the retirement income portion of Social Security, 
most Social Security systems also have benefits for disability and death that are 
somewhat difficult to replicate under the Individual Account design.  
 
In short, there seems to be nothing to recommend Individual Accounts as the plan design 
preference for a national SSRS (see also, Diamond and Orszag, 2004, 35-48 and Burtless, 
2009).  
 
Public versus Private 
 
How much of the provision of retirement income security should be the responsibility of 
society through the government and how much should be left to private/individual 
initiative? 
 
The answer to this will certainly vary based on local culture.  It is doubtful that the 
Scandinavian countries would ever have the low SSRS replacement ratios common in the 
United States, for example (or vice versa). 
 
Further, the discussion of what is public and what is private is often murky.  If private 
retirement savings have measurable tax incentives (as in most countries) then is this not 
the same as public participation?  And, many of these tax incentives have a regressive 
impact since they benefit those in higher tax brackets more.  This aspect is often missing 
in the normal debate on these matters. 
 
Clearly, there is no magically ‘correct’ answer. 
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Automatic Balancing Mechanisms 
 
SSRS that are based on Individual Accounts do not need Automatic Balancing 
Mechanisms (ABM) since the retirement benefit available to the worker is only what his 
or her account balance can purchase.  Thus, by definition, the system is always in 
‘balance’. 
 
Many DB SSRS around the world (e.g., Canada, Brazil, Sweden, Germany, and Japan) 
have introduced ABM into their systems.  These are meant to return a plan to sustainable 
financing when external forces (e.g., economic or demographic) create a non-sustainable 
balance of contributions and benefits. 
 
It seems advisable that such ABM should react towards these imbalances by sharing the 
pain as equitably as possible between workers and retirees.  If the system is based on 
defined contributions the only variable in the system on which the ABM can work must 
be the benefits.  In this case, the Automatic Balancing Mechanism will be one-sided in 
that all of the impact will be on retiree benefits (as is the case in Sweden today). 
 
 Only one of the above SSRS shares the ‘pain’ between workers and retirees at this time 
(Canada) and it can be shown that under ‘normal’ circumstances even the Canadian ABM 
hits retiree benefits harder than worker contributions. 
 
This does not seem appropriate as retirees normally have no way to respond to reduced 
benefits and reduced standards of living. 
 
System Risk Diversification 
 
A basic economic/actuarial tenet is that one way to mitigate risk (variance) is through 
diversification.  That is, don’t put all of your eggs in one basket. 
 
This tenet should extend into the design of the total retirement income security system of 
any country (see Diamond, 2004). 
 
Most countries will have a variety of sources for retirement income for their citizens that, 
in terms of system diversification, is advantageous.  These will normally include: 
 
--a basic welfare-based income financed by tax revenues; 
--a government-sponsored universal SSRS with contributions/benefits that reflect both 
individual equity and social adequacy; 
--employer-sponsored workplace pensions (DB or DC); 
--individual savings. 
 
The first layer will normally provide Defined Benefits and be financed on a PAYGO 
basis.  The second tier in most Western countries is still a Defined Benefit scheme 
although there has been a measurable shift to Defined Contribution SSRS over the past 
thirty years.  If DB, these plans are normally only partially funded (but not pure   14
PAYGO).  Similarly, employer-sponsored pension plans, thirty year ago, would have 
been primarily Defined Benefit plans but are now mostly Defined Contribution.  In either 
case, they are meant to be fully funded at any time.  Finally, individual savings are purely 
defined contribution schemes and are fully funded by definition. 
 
It can be shown that there are times when PAYGO is favorable and times when full 
funding is to be preferred.  Similarly there are economic conditions that favor DB 
systems and other environments that favor DC.   
 
However, overall it is the position of this paper that the total national system should 
represent a diversified approach to providing retirement income security.  Some parts of 
the system should be PAYGO, some fully funded.  Some benefits should be DB, and 
some DC.  But never should an entire national retirement income security system put all 
of its eggs in one basket.   
 
This is a very serious concern today as many nations are on the road to only one basket;  
namely, DC fully-funded systems.  One can find nothing in basic actuarial science 




SSRS around the world seem to be in a continuous state of flux.  Old designs are 
abandoned in favour of new science.  In many developing countries, SSRS are being 
implemented for the first time. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a schematic for public policymakers who promote 
certain SSRS design features.  Should the plan be PAYGO or Fully-funded?  Should 
minimum benefits be in a separate Pillar (0) tier or be a part of government sponsored 
Social Security in a tier (1) plan?  And so on. 
 
This paper has presented a series of decision points in the design of an optimal SSRS.  
Through a background of a strong knowledge of the existing literature, the paper has 
attempted to steer public policy decisions in a direction that history has demonstrated is 
to be preferred. 
 
It is the author’s sincere hope that the discussion above will be used to improve the 
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